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Business Failure in UK and US Quoted Firms: Impact of
Macroeconomic Instability and the Role of Legal Institutions1
A. Bhattacharjee2, C. Higson3, S. Holly2, and P. Kattuman2
March 17, 2004
ABSTRACT
Firms exit through the mutually precluding events of bankruptcy and ac-
quisition. We use a competing risks hazard regression model to identify the
characteristics leading to each of these two outcomes using over thirty years of
data on US and UK quoted firms. We find evidence about the way in which
macroeconomic factors affect firm survival in these two economies, in addition to
firm and industry-specific factors. Further, there are significant differences in the
way in which firms in the US and the UK react to changes in the macroeconomic
environment and, particularly to macroeconomic instability. We argue that these
differences in response may be attributable to differences in bankruptcy codes in
the US and the UK.
Subject headings: Bankruptcy, Acquisitions, Macroeconomic Instability, Com-
peting Risks Cox Proportional Hazards Model, Chapter 11, Receivership
JEL classification: L16, G33, E32, K22, C41
1. Introduction
Uncertainty tends to make rational firms delay their investment and disinvestment de-
cisions. Since investment can be in new or in acquired capital, macroeconomic instability
can be expected to reduce demand in the acquisitions market. But uncertainty also tends
to increase financial distress, so fewer distressed firms will be saved from bankruptcy by
2University of Cambridge, UK.
3London Business School, UK.
1This work was supported by KPMG. Corresponding author: Arnab Bhattacharjee. Tel.: +44-1223-
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acquisition just when the pool of distressed firms is growing. Uncertainty increases the value
of continuing in business, but the ability of a financially distressed firm to postpone dis-
investment will be constrained by its creditors and will depend on the legal environment.
Reorganisation systems like Chapter 11 may act as a safe haven for distressed firms dur-
ing adverse macroeconomic conditions, enabling some of them to recover and perhaps be
acquired, thus attenuating the impact of macroeconomic instability on bankruptcy hazard.
The existing literatures on the causes and consequences of acquisitions and on the
causes of bankruptcy are substantial, but largely separate4. In reality, bankruptcy and
acquisition can be expected to be partially codetermined — firms at risk of going bankrupt
may instead be acquired and their assets redeployed — but only a few papers develop a
unified framework nesting acquisitions and bankruptcies as twin routes to exit (Schary,
1991; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). Further, relatively little work exists on the role of
the macroeconomic environment in firm exits. Caves (1998) notes that “... these studies
... control for macroeconomic conditions in various ways and degrees, but they leave the
impression that... hazard rates are rather insensitive to the observed variation in the macro
environment”(pp.1958).5
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of macroeconomic instability on
business failure. We develop and test a model in which two competing modes of firm exit,
bankruptcy and acquisition, are codetermined by firm-level and industry-level factors and by
macroeconomic conditions. In Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) a firm takes several decisions
each period — the decision to exit (either because of distress, or because the firm’s continua-
tion value falls below the selling price of its assets), the decision to invest, and the decision
to invest in acquired capital. We use this framework to analyse the effect of macroeconomic
conditions on these investment and disinvestment decisions.
The model is applied to panel data on listed US and UK firms; the data include firm
exits over a long period of time covering several business cycles. Joint determination of
the probability of firms being acquired and going bankrupt are explicitly modelled using
competing risks hazard regression models. The estimated models show that macroeconomic
conditions have a significant impact on bankruptcy and acquisition hazard both in the US
and the UK, controlling for firm and industry factors suggested by the existing literature.
4See Shleifer and Vishny (2003) for a review of the acquisitions literature; Siegfried and Evans (1994)
and Caves (1998) for a review of the literature on determinants of firm failures; and Altman and Saunders
(1997) for a review of the literature on credit-scoring models.
5See Appendix 1 and Bhattacharjee et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical
literature.
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Macroeconomic instability increases bankruptcy hazard, and reduces acquisition activity.
The theoretical model shows how reduced acquisition activity may contribute to higher
bankruptcy levels in instable periods (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Further, the impact of
instability on bankruptcy is observed to be much less marked in the US than in the UK.
This difference in responsiveness to macroeconomic instability is partly attributable to the
use of Chapter 11 reorganisation, which is available in the US but not in the UK.6
Section 2 develops an economic model of the firm’s exit decision and explains the cor-
responding econometric model. Section 3 describes the data and choice of variables, while
the results of the econometric analysis are presented and discussed in Section 4. We collect
conclusions in Section 5. Appendices provide a detailed derivation and discussion of the
economic model, compare the bankruptcy codes in the US and the UK, provide a selective
review of the theoretical and empirical literature on firm exits, and explain the econometric
methodology in more detail.
2. The model
2.1. A model of the competing risks of firm exit7
At any time, t, each firm, i, is at some risk of exit through bankruptcy or by being
acquired. Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the way macroeconomic conditions
may affect exit risks. On one side are firms that exit due to financial distress (both through
bankruptcy and through being acquired) or that choose to exit even when they are not
distressed. Adverse macroeconomic conditions induce financial distress in a larger pool of
firms. On the other side are investor firms who are in the market for acquisitions. Any
firm that is not distressed will be characterised by some optimal level of investment Ii,t,
conditional on the level and stability of the macroeconomy. The optimal investment, which
maximises the expected present value of the firms’ assets, will comprise both investment in
new capital, X, and acquired capital, Y . The optimal balance between X and Y depends
on the relative prices of acquired and new capital, as well as on the fixed and adjustment
cost of acquisitions.
6The welfare implications of protection to failing firms is an issue of considerable importance; Mooradian
(1994) and Mason and Weeds (2003) discuss conditions under which such legal protection to firms that would
otherwise be liquidated may be welfare-enhancing. Consideration of this issue is outside the scope of the
current work and is not addressed in this paper.
7See Appendix 2 for a detailed derivation and discussion of the model.
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Let the ith firm’s state of technology (or efficiency) at time t be denoted by zit and
its capital by Kit. Firms operate under a production function which takes the form f(z)K.
Here f(z) is akin to the output-capital ratio and depends on firm efficiency: ∂f(z)/∂z > 0.
We assume that the dynamics in z and the economy wide macro-environment variable u are
each governed by Markov transition processes. z and u are each assumed to be positively
autocorrelated, and independent of each other. Hence, z and u are jointly Markov, i.e.,
Pr[zi,t+1 ≤ z
′, ut+1 ≤ u
′|zit = z, ut = u] = F (z
′, u′|z, u).
Profits can then be written as [f(z)−C(x, y)− x− g(u)]K, where x and y are the (per
unit capital) investments in new and acquired capital respectively (i = x + y), C(x, y) is
the (per unit capital) adjustment cost of investment, and g(u) is the firm specific impact of
instability on profits. g(u) is increasing and convex in u, and g(0) = 0. Normalising the
price of new capital to unity, and denoting the price of acquired capital by q (q < 1), the
market value of the firm per unit of capital is:
Q(z, u) = maxx≥0,y≥0{f(z)− C(x, y)− x− qy − g(u) + (1− δ + x+ y)Q
′(z, u)},
where
Q′(z, u) =
1
1 + r
∫ ∫
max{q,Q(z′, u′)dF (z′, u′|z, u)}
is the discounted expected present value of capital in the next period given the firm’s z and
the economy’s u today. Since z and u are independent and positively autocorrelated, Q(z, u)
is increasing in z and decreasing in u. Denote by ze(u) the level of z at which the firm is
indifferent between exiting and staying in business, given the macroeconomic conditions, and
by z∗(u), the level of technology at which the firm is indifferent between staying out of the
acquisitions market or entering it.8
In a stable period, when demand is more predictable, the incidence of financial distress
will be lower. The smaller pool of distressed firms may also face a larger number of potential
acquirers whose investment stances are encouraged by macroeconomic stability. Thus firms
that are on the verge of bankruptcy will have a higher probability of being rescued and
8We assume a fixed deadweight cost of investing in acquired capital. This ensures existence of a threshold
level z∗, above which a firm invests in acquired capital, and below which it does not (Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2002).
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observed bankruptcy rates will be lower. Further, in such periods the hazard of acquisitions
will be higher, even though there are fewer distressed firms that are candidates for acquisition.
With the boost to investment in more stable times, the market for acquisitions may tighten,
driving up the market price of acquired assets. This can be expected to induce a larger
number of non-distressed firms to enter the pool of potential acquirees. These would be
firms who find the offers from potential acquirers to be higher than their own continuation
values (Jovanovic and Rosseau, 2001). Thus overall, in a stable period, the propensity for
bankruptcy will be lower, and the propensity for acquisitions will be higher.
The implications of changes in u for firm exits and acquisitions can be understood with
reference to a plot of the four regions of z, in the spirit of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002).
Let u > u, then ze (u) > ze(u) and z
∗ (u) > z∗(u) (Figure 2). Evidently, in a period with
higher u, more firms make the decision to exit, and less firms make the decision to acquire.
Hence, more firms would go bankrupt during these periods.
2.2. Econometric methodology
We employ hazard regression models within a competing risks framework to study the
impact of various explanatory factors (covariates) on firm exit. Unlike discrete outcome or
scoring models (probit, logit etc.), hazard models explicitly incorporate the timing of alter-
native outcomes, and segregate the age aspect of the propensity to survive or exit from the
effect of other covariates. This is important in disentangling the influence of macroeconomic
conditions on business exit from those of firm-specific and industry factors.
The risk of bankruptcy and acquisitions is modelled in a unified framework where each
firm is conceived as being concurrently under risk of bankruptcy and acquisition during each
year over its lifetime. Bankruptcy and acquisitions may be thought of as mutually exclusive
outcomes that are governed by their own underlying driving processes and compete to restrict
the survival of a firm. Under a hazard regression framework, these processes can be suitably
parametrised using a competing risk model. Under this model, inference is based on the
cause-specific intensity (hazard) rates λh(t; θ), defined as
λh(t; θ) = lim
ǫ↓0
1
ǫ
P [T < t+ ǫ;H = h|T ≥ t; θ]
where T is the random variable denoting the age at failure, H = 1, ...k are the k competing
causes of failure, and λh(0; θ) = 0;h = 1, ...k.
The Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model conveniently describes the regression re-
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lationship between the cause-specific hazard rates corresponding to the competing causes
of failure and various explanatory variables (covariates). These describe firm characteris-
tics such as firm size and profitability and industry characteristics (jointly f
i,t
), and the
macroeconomic environment (ut), given the age of the firm since listing (ai,t). The macro
environment will depend on the level of overall economic activity and primary sources of
macroeconomic instability such as volatility in price levels, interest rates, and exchange
rates. The model postulates that the logarithm of the cause-specific hazard function is a
linear function of the covariates,
λh(ai,t, zi,t; θh) = λ0h (ai,t) . exp
[
θh
′zi,t
]
where H = 1, ...k are the k competing causes of failure, λ0h(.) are the baseline hazard
functions correponding to the h-th cause of failure9, zi,t is the vector of covariates (comprising
both f
i,t
) and ut), and θh are the vectors of coefficients corresponding to the h-th cause
of failure. This is a flexible regression framework for the study of the impact of various
covariates on the hazards of failure due to competing causes, as well as differences in the way
different cause-specific hazards vary with changes in the explanatory variables. The cause-
specific hazard rates of bankruptcy and acquisition may then be written as λb(ai,t|f i,t, ut)
and λa(ai,t|f i,t, ut) respectively. λb will increase in ut (adverse macroeconomic conditions,
including instability), and λa will decrease in ut.
2.3. The effect of bankruptcy codes10
Conclusions about the effect of u on bankruptcy depend on the institutional setting and
in particular on whether the bankruptcy code permits firms to take legal shelter from their
creditors for a period of time. Such a mechanism is not available in the UK but does exist
in the US in the form of Chapter 11. Chapter 11 was instituted on October 1, 1979, as a
consequence of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Before then the US bankruptcy code
was similar to, and historically derived from, the insolvency system in the UK (Skeel, 2001).
A primary aim of the 1978 Act was to make it easier for businesses and individuals to file for
bankruptcy in order to reorganise. To facilitate this, the existing management (‘the debtor’)
9In our case, h is binary — bankruptcy or acquisition. In one of the applications considered later in the
paper, h constitutes the alternative legal routes to bankruptcy in the US, namely Chapter 11 and Chapter
7.
10See Appendix 3 for a discussion of the legal institutional setting in the two economies.
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continues to manage the firm and retain significant rights as debtor-in-possession. Filing
under Chapter 11 stays almost all claims, and while interest accrues on fully secured debt it
does not accrue on unsecured or partly secured debt. The court mandates the management
to propose a reorganisation plan. The initial 120 days to do this may be extended repeatedly
by the court and for medium to large firms the Chapter 11 process typically takes two to
three years (LoPucki and Whitford, 1993a,b), and in some cases may continue for over six
years.
Large listed US firms in distress rarely file directly under Chapter 7, which constitutes
automatic liqidation, and go initially through Chapter 11. The court may then decide that
the continuation value of the firm is low and convert a Chapter 11 filing to Chapter 7.
Evans (2003) finds that a significant number of firms that are retained under Chapter 11
either get reorganised or are acquired by other firms. Out of the sample of 290 firms that
completed voluntary Chapter 11 filings in Evans (2003), 41 per cent (which is 118 firms)
were reorganized in Chapter 11; 79 of these 118 firms restructured their debt and 39 were
acquired as part of the plan of reorganization. Of the 172 cases converted to Chapter 7, 4
were because of failed acquisition.
The receivership system has offered the principle alternative to immediate liquidation
for a distressed firm in the UK, but Chapter 11 and receivership are substantially different
in their effects. The receiver represents creditors and replaces management and the appoint-
ment of a receiver closes off all other options. Moreover, the receiver’s scope for action is
severely limited by secured creditors who can withdraw the assets over which they have secu-
rity even though those assets are vital for continuing the business. The UK 1986 Insolvency
Act introduced the ‘administration’ process to offer some of the characteristics of Chapter
11 but secured creditors can block the appointment of an administrator by appointing a
receiver and, in practice, administration has been used relatively little. In terms of the
formal bankruptcy code the 1986 Act has not materially changed the creditor orientation
of the UK system. In both the US and the UK informal workouts may avoid bankruptcy
proceedings altogether and some commentators have argued that, in the nineties in the UK,
large banks have been more effective in softening the impact of the bankruptcy code through
coordination on workouts (Armour et al., 2002).
Reorganisation systems like Chapter 11 act as a safe haven for distressed firms in periods
of high macroeconomic instability, enabling some of these firms to recover and perhaps be
acquired. We predict that adverse macroeconomic conditions and instability may have a
stronger impact in increasing bankruptcy hazard in the UK than in the US and, as a second
order effect, a stronger impact in depressing acquisitions in the US than in the UK .
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3. Data and construction of variables
3.1. Data
The evaluation of the impact of macroeconomic conditions on firm exits requires data
spanning several business cycles. For the US, we use the Compustat database for data on
firm accounts matched with the CRSP database to identify listed firms and to extract listing
data. This gives an unbalanced panel of about 13,700 US industrial and commercial firms
over the period 1969 to 2000. There were 566 exits due to bankruptcy and 2,529 acquisitions
in around 133,000 firm years over the 32 year period. For the UK, we use the Cambridge-DTI,
Datastream and Exstat databases of firm accounts matched with the London Share Price
Database (LSPD). This provides an unbalanced panel of about 4,300 UK listed industrial
and commercial firms over the period 1965 to 1998. There are 166 instances of bankruptcy
and 1,859 acquisitions in around 49,000 firm years over the 34 year period11.
For each US firm listed at any point over the period of analysis, the data used for the
analysis pertain to years, since 1969, during which the firm was listed on any of the stock
exchanges in the US12. Similarly, for the UK, the data pertain to years, since 1965, when
the firm was listed on the London Stock Exchange. Hence, for each firm, the available data
are left-truncated, and do not pertain to the entire period that it is listed. The data are
censored to the right, by the competing causes of exits, including delisting. The covariates
used to explain exit-probabilities or hazard rates are time varying covariates, representing
firm-level and industry-level characteristics as well as indicators of macroeconomic conditions
and volatility.
Figures 3 and 4 for the UK and Figures 5 and 6 for the US plot the annual incidence
of bankruptcies and acquisitions, respectively, against the business cycle indicator for the
year. In the UK, the incidence of bankruptcy is high during years when the economy turned
down after a peak, and lower during upturns in the business cycle, while acquisitions are
procyclical. For the US the pattern is similar, except that the responsiveness of bankrupt-
cies to turnaround in the business cycle is lower for the US than for the UK. These plots
11A firm may stop publishing accounts one or two years prior to actually being declared bankrupt. From
the point of view of econometrically modelling bankruptcy it is sensible to reassign the date of bankruptcy
to the year of last published accounts when the firm has been declared bankrupt within a 2 year period.
This implies that our assignment of a bankruptcy to a particular point in time may be characterised as the
time period when the “real”economic bankruptcy takes place, rather than the year when the firm is actually
declared bankrupt.
12The NYSE/AMEX, NASDAQ, Over-the-Counter or any of the regional exchanges (Boston, Midwest,
Montreal, Pacific or Philadelphia).
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suggest that macro instability is important in explaining the survival of listed firms, before
conditioning on firm and industry-specific characteristics.
The competing risks framework involves estimation of two separate Cox PH models,
one for exits due to bankruptcy and one for acquisitions. In each case we treat exits due
to the other cause as censored cases, in addition to observations originally censored (due
to delisting and other reasons). The duration data are, thus, left-truncated, (randomly)
right censored by (potentially dependent) competing risks, and the covariates explaining the
nature of the cause-specific hazards are time-varying. We obtain efficient estimates of the
model parameters making the censoring duration non-informative about the exit duration,
after conditioning on an adequate selection of covariates. Further, we take into account
possible violation of the proportionality assumption inherent in the Cox regression model,
by allowing the covariate effects to vary over the age of the firm.13
The duration data are augmented by annual indicators of macroeconomic conditions,
as well as firm and industry-specific factors. Here, we describe the construction of covariates
for the US data; the constructs for the UK data are similar.
Measures of macroeconomic conditions.
We include a number of measures of macroeconomic conditions as covariates in the
estimated hazard regression models. Output gap (ot), the difference between the trend
output and actual output, is measured by an HP-filtered series of output per capita. The
sharpness of the economic turnaround is measured by [ot − ot−1] − [ot−1 − ot−2], which is
the increment of the change in output gap in the current year (ot − ot−1) from that in the
previous year. This is a measure of the curvature or second order derivative of the HP filter
of output per capita. Over a business cycle, this measure would be lowest right after the
peak, when the economy turns around downwards, and continue to increase gradually upto
its maximum right after the trough, when the economy picks up. Over different business
cycles, this measure would be lower (or higher) for a cycle in which the economy turns down
sharply after a sharp upturn (or turns up sharply after a sharp downturn).
Real interest rates are measured as the annual average of monthly 10-year treasury
bill rates, minus the annual rate of inflation. The exchange rate is measured by the annual
average of monthly nominal broad dollar index (based on appropriate trade composition with
G-10 economies). We measure instability in the foreign exchange markets by the year-on-year
13Refer to Appendix 4 and Bhattacharjee et al. (2002) for further details of the econometric methodology
underlying the efficient estimation of the model under dependent competing risks, and potential violation of
proportionality.
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change in the exchange rate. Instability in prices, and long-and short-term interest rates are
measured by the largest month-to-month rate of change within the year, of consumer price
index, 10-year T-bill rates, and 3-month T-bill rates respectively. The indicator of business
entries is the log-difference of the number of new listed firms in the accounting database for
each year.
Firm and industry determinants of failure and acquisition.
The existing theoretical and empirical literature has identified several firm and industry-
specific features as important determinants of firm exits (Siegfried and Evans, 1994; Caves,
1998).14 The literature suggests that the age of a firm is an important determinant of survival
probabilities of new entrants, though it is not clearly indicated whether the same may also
hold for mature (listed) firms. In our hazard model specification, we consider age-since-listing
(in years) as the measure of firm age and explore this issue.
Other firm-level factors, such as size (or start-up size), firm-level efficiency /productivity,
and financial constraints are reported to be significant for firm exits. We proxy these firm-
level effects with firm age, size, the ratio ofcash flow to capital, and return on capital. Size
is measured as the logarithm of fixed capital (in real terms), incremented by unity. Cash
flow is measured as the total of operating profits and depreciation, net of taxes (excluding
taxes on non-operating income, but including taxes saved on interest payments). Cash flow
to capital is the ratio of cash flow to total assets. Return on capital is the ratio of post-tax
profits to capital employed. Besides firm-level factors, several industry characteristics are
also observed to have significant impact on exit rates; we use industry dummies to capture
these effects.
The sample characteristics display significant variability both across firms, and over the
period of analysis (the 32-year period 1969 to 2000 for the US, and the 34-year period 1965
to 1998 for the UK).
4. Results
4.1. Impact of macroeconomic conditions on firm exit
Table 1 presents parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit measures for the four models
(for bankruptcies and acquisitions, and for the two economies). Controlling for industry
and firm-level characteristics, macroeconomic conditions have a significant impact on hazard
14Selective reviews of the literature are contained in Appendix 1 and Bhattacharjee et al. (2002).
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rates of exit by bankruptcy or acquisition in both economies. But there are considerable
differences in the impact of the macroeconomy on business failure in the UK and the US.
Figures 7 and 8 show hazard ratios against the quantiles of volatilty in the different
macroeconomic factors, for the US and the UK. The effect of macroeconomic instability is
non-linear and strong for UK quoted firms, but is smaller for US firms. Youngest UK firms
are more likely to go bankrupt immediately after the economy passes its peak; whereas there
is no significant effect of economic turnaround on US bankruptcies, after controlling for firm
and industry-specific characteristics and other macroeconomic factors. The hazard ratio at
the 3rd percentile of stability according to this measure is about 20 times higher than that
at the 97th percentile in the UK, while for the US firms the hazards are about the same at
both these percentiles.
Similarly, more UK firms go bankrupt in periods when the exchange rate is stronger
while no such effect is observed for US firms. Young UK firms are likely to go bankrupt during
years when the domestic currency depreciates sharply (the hazard for the 97th percentile
is 14 times that for the 3rd percentile) while no such effect can be detected in the US (the
hazards are about the same). Price instability increases bankruptcy in the UK, but not in
the US. While interest rate instability does not have much effect on bankruptcy; bankruptcy
in the US, if anything, is lower in periods of high interest rate instability.
For acquisitions, empirical observations are broadly in line with our a priori expecta-
tions. Both UK and US firms are more likely to be acquired during growth phases in the
economy than during downturns. Price instability has only a marginal effect on acquisitions
in either economy. In both economies, firms are more likely to be acquired during periods
of higher long-term real rates of interest. However, unlike the UK, acquisitions in the US
are depressed in years when real rates of interest are volatile; similarly, in years when the
exchange rate increases sharply.
4.2. Firm and industry-level factors
Firm-level covariates and industry, proxied by industry dummies, are also significant in
determining exit rates. While exit rate declines in size at higher ranges in the UK, very large
US firms (except very young) are more likely to exit. As expected, bankruptcy is declining
in profitability and cash flow in both economies. Among US firms and younger firms in the
UK, those with higher cash flow are more likely to be acquired.
The age of firms, post-listing, significantly affects exit rates due to both bankruptcy and
acquisitions. Plots of the baseline cumulative hazard functions of bankruptcy, for the UK
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and the US, against the post-listing age of the firm show a convex pattern. This indicates
that exit rates due to bankruptcy decline with age (learning effect), after controlling for
covariates. In the case of quoted US firms, the baseline hazard for bankruptcy seems to be
lower in the first 8 years of post-listing life as compared to ages 8-25 years, before declining
again after 25 years. This is consistant with what Evans (1987) and Dunne et al. (1989)
report for new firms in the US. While the baseline hazard due to acquisitions in the UK
appears to be constant over the post-listing lifetime of a firm, this shows a declining trend
in the US.
Figures 3 to 6 also show the year-wise predicted incidence rates15 of bankruptcies and
acquisitions in both economies. The close proximity of the predicted and observed incidence
rates is noteworthy. This indicates the ability of our estimated models to reflect aggregate
trends in the number of corporate bankruptcies and acquisitions in the UK and the US.
There has been some debate in the literature regarding the explanation for merger waves
in the US. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) explain these in terms of availability of profitable
capital reallocation opportunities (their model does not explain the 1960s merger wave well)
while Shleifer and Vishny (2003) stress the role of stock market misvaluations. Our model
predicts all the major merger waves in the US (end of the 1960s, the 1980s and 1990s) fairly
well, and provides an alternative (macroeconomic) explanation for these merger waves.
4.3. The impact of Chapter 11
Differences in bankruptcy code may be one reason for the differential impact of insta-
bility on bankruptcies in the US and the UK. We argued in Section 2 that US Chapter 11,
which has no correlate in the UK, may reduce the impact of instability on bankruptcies in
the US. Chapter 11 may have a second order effect on acquisitions, by providing a ready
supply of acquisition candidates during periods of low instability and of high demand for
acquired capital. To the extent that Chapter 11 shields businesses from bankruptcy during
periods of high macroeconomic instability, the detrimental effect of instability on bankrupt-
cies may be lower on firms that follow the Chapter 11 route as compared with those that
pass through Chapter 7. If this were true, Chapter 7 bankruptcies, like bankruptcies in the
UK, may respond more to the macroeconomic instability than Chapter 11 bankruptcies.16
15By incidence rate, we mean the number of firms that fail as a proportion of total firms in business during
that year.
16There is a self-selection issue here, in that only unviable firms may be sent to the Chapter 7 route.
However, if after conditioning on adequate firm and industry-level covariates, the exits through Chapter 7
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We estimate models for bankruptcies separately for Chapter 11 (since 198017) and Chap-
ter 7 (including all bankruptcies upto 1979 and the Chapter 7 ones since then) under a similar
competing risks framework. As compared with Chapter 11, Chapter 7 bankruptcies display
a higher sensitivity to instability, especially to interest rate and exchange rate volatility.
The plot of log-hazard ratios against quantiles of aggregate uncertainty18 (Figure 8) provide
further support for this observation. While the hazard of bankruptcy through the Chapter
11 route at the 97th percentile of aggregate uncertainty is only about twice as high as that at
the 3rd percentile, the hazard for Chapter 7 bankruptcies at the 97th percentile is 24 times
as high as that at the 3rd percentile. For each year, we use these estimated models to predict
the proportion of firms that would have failed through the Chapter 11 route as against those
failing through Chapter 7; Figure 9 shows that the expected number of bankruptcies from
Chapter 11 is rather less than those from Chapter 7. A similar test for the effect of Chap-
ter 11 on the number of acquisitions was carried out by estimating models for acquisitions
separately for the periods 1969 to 1979, and 1980 to 2000. The estimates for the 1980-2000
period show higher responsiveness to macroeconomic instability, but this difference is not as
striking as the difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
In summary, we find evidence that the differences in the impact of macroeconomic
instability on bankruptcy hazard can be attributed, in significant measure, to the difference
between the Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 route. In other words, the legal protection afforded
under Chapter 11 in the US appears to reduce the adverse effect of macroeconomic instability
on bankruptcies.
5. Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between business exits and macroeconomic insta-
bility, based on an economic model of the exit decisions of firms. Our model predicts higher
bankruptcy and lower acquisitions in periods of high macroeconomic instability. Further, the
and Chapter 11 are rendered independent of each other, then the usual partial likelihood inference would be
valid; this is very similar to the non-informativeness argument embodied in hazard regression models with
censoring due to competing risks. Thus, so far as the impact of macroeconomic conditions on exits through
Chapters 7 and 11 go, we can make adequate inference, conditional on firm and industry-level covariates, if
the decision process allocating firms to these two routes depend only on these covariates.
17The Chapter 11 reorganisation process was instituted in 1979; all observations on Chapter 11 bankruptcy
exits are post 1979.
18Aggregate uncertainty is measured a linear combination of interest rate and exchange rate volatility that
is implied by the estimates for the model for bankruptcies in the US.
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model indicates that the impact of instability may be lower in the presence of legal systems
like Chapter 11 that temporarily protect distressed firms from bankruptcy. We estimate an
econometric competing risks model for the probabilities of exit through bankruptcies and
acquisitions, in terms of firm and industry characteristics and features of the business cycle,
for large and mature (listed) US and UK firms, over a long period. At the firm level our
findings corroborate earlier results. The estimated model also explains the observed time
variation in the incidence of bankruptcy and acquisitions quite well.
While macroeconomic conditions and instability influence firm exits in both the US and
the UK, after controlling for firm and industry-specific factors, the effect on bankruptcy is
more pronounced in the UK, and on acquisitions more pronounced in the US. We attribute
these differences in the impact of the macro-environment to differences in bankruptcy codes
in the two economies.
References
Altman, E.I. and Saunders, A. (1997). Credit risk measurement: Developments over the last
twenty years. Journal of Banking and Finance 21. 1721—1742.
Armour, J., Cheffins, B.R. and Skeel, D.A. Jr. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the
evolution of bankruptcy law: Lessons from the UK. Vanderbilt Law Review 55. 1699—1785.
Bhattacharjee, A., Higson, C., Holly, S. and Kattuman, P. (2002). Macro economic instability
and business exit: Determinants of failures and acquisitions of large UK firms. DAEWorking
Paper 0206, Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge.
Caves, R.E. (1998). Industrial organization and new findings on the turnover and mobility of
firms. Journal of Economic Literature 36. 1947—1982.
Dunne, T., Roberts, M.J. and Samuelson, L. (1989). The growth and failure of U.S. manufac-
turing plants. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104. 671—698.
Evans, D.S. (1987). The relationship between firm growth, size, and age: Estimates for 100
manufacturing industries. Journal of Industrial Economics 35. 567—581.
Evans, J. (2003). The effect of discretionary actions on small firms’ ability to survive Chapter
11 bankruptcy. Journal of Corporate Finance 9. 115—128.
Jovanovic, B. and Rousseau, P.L. (2001). Acquisitions and Technological Change: 1885—1998.
Working Paper No. 01-W16. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
— 15 —
–– and –– (2002). The Q-Theory of acquisitions. American Economic Review - Papers
and Proceedings. May 2002.
LoPucki, L.M. and Whitford, W.C. (1993a). Corporate governance in the bankruptcy reorga-
nization of large publicly held firms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 141, 669—800.
–– and –– (1993b). Bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held firms. Cornell Law
Review, 597—618.
Mason, R. and Weeds, H. (2003). The failing firm defence: Merger policy and entry. Mimeo.
Mooradian, R.M. The effect of bankruptcy protection on investment: Chapter 11 as a screening
device. Journal of Finance 49. 1403—1430.
Schary, M.A. (1991). The probability of exit. Rand Journal of Economics 22. 339—353.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1992). Liquidation Values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium
approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343—1366.
–– and –– (2003). Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics.
Forthcoming.
Siegfried, J.J. and Evans, L.B. (1994). Empirical studies of entry and exit: A survey of the
evidence. Review of Industrial Organization 9. 121—155.
Skeel, D.A., Jr. (2001). Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America. Princeton
University Press: Princeton and Oxford.
— 16 —
Appendix 1: Literature review
The existing literature on firm exits is sizeable but fragmented; Siegfried and Evans (1994)
and Caves (1998) elaborately review the existing literature. A number of papers identify
firm-level characteristics that determine failure and acquisition, and describe the time-series
properties of the aggregate failure and acquisition processes.
Most of the existing literature examines the influence of firm-level factors such as financial
performance, size and firm age on either the bankruptcy or the acquisition process. Rel-
atively few studies analyse acquisitions and corporate failure within a unified framework,
and hence not much is known about the extent to which bankruptcies and acquisitions are
co-determined. Also, not much is known about the way in which macroeconomic conditions
and instability affect exit decisions at the firm-level.
Aggregate and macro determinants of failure
The aggregate levels of bankruptcy and acquisition are usually believed to be cyclical.
Bankruptcies are associated with recessions and acquisitions with economic recoveries. Futher,
studies that focus on the impact of aggregate shocks on aggregate measures of firm formation
and dissolution suggest that entry and exit rates are highly correlated, though the strength
of this relationship differs across industries and over the ascending and descending stages of
the business cycle. However, there is not much empirical evidence, at the firm-level, about
the impact of the macroeconomy on business exit, and neither do the micro-based theories
explain why the acquisition and failure processes should be episodic. Caves (1998), in his
review of the literature on exits of new entrants, points out: “... these studies of intertem-
poral entry-exit linkages control for macroeconomic conditions in various ways and degrees,
but they leave the impression that ... hazard rates are rather insensitive to the observed
variation in the macro environment”(pp.1958). In a slightly different context, some recent
work suggests that the macroeconomic environment may affect firm specific features (such
as financial structure and profitability of firms) (Higson et al., 2002), which in turn may
have an impact on exit hazard.
Several studies have noted that entry and exit rates are highly correlated (Schwalbach, 1991,
studies several countries; Dunne et al., 1989; and Dunne and Roberts, 1991, study the US;
and Geroski, 1991a, 1991b, study the UK), though the nature of the relationship between
the entry and exit differ across industries (Agarwal and Gort, 1996), as well as over the
ascending and descending stages of the business cycle (Boeri and Bellman, 1995; Sleuwaegen
and Dehandschutter, 1991; Baldwin and Johnson, 1996; and Mata et al., 1995). Over the
business cycle, exit rates increase during the downturn (Caballero and Hammour, 1994, 1996;
and Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995).
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Cooley and Quadrini (1999) present a general equilibrium model of firms reacting to macroe-
conomic financial drivers and show how financial factors affect firm survival through the
internal finance channel, and why the response of small firms might be larger.19 Delli Gatti
et al. (2000, 2001) also present a theoretical model linking the macro-economic environment,
financial fragility and entry and exit of firms. These models await empirical support.20
At the firm level, Goudie and Meeks (1991, 1992, 1998) have explored the role of macroeco-
nomic factors in corporate failure by tracing the probable effects of exogenous macro shocks
upon the finances and viability of individual companies by simulating their financial state-
ments, contingent on macroeconomic developments. They found a significant asymmetric
and non-linear impact of the exchange rate on the failure rates of UK companies. Through
retrospective analysis of macro shocks they show how for a notable minority among the
major failing corporations, the shock determined their collapse.
In a recent paper, Bhattacharjee et. al (2002) find empirical evidence that, in addition
to firm and industry-specific factors, macroeconomic conditions and instability significantly
affect failure of quoted firms in the UK. Further, they observe notable differences in the way
in which recently listed firms, and those listed some years previously respond to changes in
the macro-economic environment. There is higher propensity of UK firms that have been
listed during the upturn of the business cycle to go bankrupt as soon as the economy turns
down. Firms that have weathered the downturn after their listing and in that sense proven
themselves “capable”, are most likely to be acquired immediately after the economy enters
an up phase. Uncertainty in the form of sharp increases in inflation and sharp depreciation
of the Pound adversely affect freshly listed firms in the UK. They are more likely to go
bankrupt during such years; particularly because acquistion activity is also subdued in such
years. Similar empirical microeconomic evidence on the impact of macroeconomic factors is
largely lacking for other economies, including the US. A natural question arises as to whether
such effects are absent in these other economies, and if so, why.
Firm and Industry-level determinants of failure21
“Passive learning”formulations (Jovanovic, 1982; also Hopenhayn, 1992 and Cabral, 1993)
19Their simulation exercise suggests that financial factors do not affect aggregate economy in a large way,
though they may cause volatility in financial markets, particularly stock markets.
20Among other models, Corres and Ioannides (1996) present a model that allows for three kinds of exits
- bankruptcy, (endogenous) exits when the current value of expected profit stream falls below a threshold
(voluntary liquidation), and (exogenous) exits caused by macro-economic shocks. See also Abowd et al.
(1995).
21See also reviews by Siegfried and Evans (1994) and Caves (1998).
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model firms as entering uncertain of their capability, and then receiving repeated noisy
signals of their capability, which induce them to expand, contract, or exit. These models
predict that exit hazard declines with firm age though not necessarily from the outset. Low
capability firms learn only from experience about their poor fitness. Empirical evidence
in favour of the model includes Evans (1987) and Dunne et al. (1989) on US firms. In
the “active learning”formulation (Nelson and Winter, 1978; Ericson and Pakes, 1992, 1995;
Pakes and Ericson, 1998) firms invest in uncertain but expectedly profitable innovations, and
grow if successful, shrink or exit if unsuccessful.22 Empirical evidence suggests that exit rates
decline with firm age (Dunne et al., 1989 and Audretsch, 1991, for the US; Baldwin, 1995,
in Canada; Mata et al., 1995, in Portugal; and Disney et al., 2000, for the UK), consistent
with theoretical models of learning.
Growth rates and exits vary with nominal and real shocks (Judd and Treham, 1995). Firm-
level factors, such as size (and start-up size) (Dunne et. al., 1989; Mata et al., 1995; and
Caves, 1998) and financial fragility (Fazzari et al., 1988; Klepper, 1996; Cooley and Quadrini,
1998, 1999; Delli Gatti et al., 2000, 2001) are significant for firm exits. The impact of firm-
level efficiency (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1991), productivity (Winter, 1999; Doms et al.,
1995) and profitability (Schary, 1991; Corres and Ioannides, 1996) on business failure have
also been explored.
Industry characteristics, such as technology orientation (Mahmood, 1992) and presence of
MNCs (technology transfers) (Go˝rg and Strobl, 2000) have significant impact on exit rates,
while market growth and R&D intensity appears to have relatively negligible effect (Mah-
mood, 1992).
Aggregate and macro determinants of mergers
Research on aggregate merger activity fall in two branches. The first aims at understanding
the time series patterns in aggregate merger activity, and has found evidence of merger waves
and stochastic trends (recently Chowdhury, 1993; Linn and Zhu, 1997). The second branch,
the merger-macro literature, seeks explanation of merger wave patterns in terms of economy
wide macroeconomic and financial variables that display a similar cyclical pattern. Jovanovic
and Rousseau (2002) explain these in terms of availability of profitable capital reallocation
opportunities, and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) stress the role of stock market misvaluations.
Evidence suggests that merger activity is positively related to aggregate share price levels
(recently Benzing, 1991, 1993; Clarke and Ioannidis, 1996). With respect to other aggregate
22Plants descend through the productivity ranking with age until refurbished or retired. Passive learning
model fit retailing sector better, while active learning may be more appropriate for the manufacturing sector
(Pakes and Ericson, 1998).
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or economy-wide measures23, evidence is mixed (recently, Weston et al., 1990; Crook, 1995,
1996). With the exception of Bhattacharjee et al. (2002) and Goudie and Meeks (1991,
1992, 1998), none of the studies has explicitly analysed the micro-evidence for the impact of
macroeconomic conditions.
Firm level determinants of mergers
The main discriminator between acquirers and their targets is size, while targets do not
seem to be generally under-performers (e.g. Singh, 1971, 1975; Meeks, 1977; Cosh et al.,
1980; Levine and Aaranovitch, 1981; Kumar, 1984; Palepu, 1986; Powell and Thomas, 1994;
Powell, 1997). The studies by Singh give early evidence that the already great degree of
overlap of characteristics between acquirers and their targets becomes greater during ’merger
booms’. Evidence suggests that discriminating factors vary in strength and nature depending
on whether the period under study is a merger boom or a normal merger activity period
(e.g. Cosh et al., 1989; Higson and Elliott, 1993; Antoniou et al., 1998).
Gaps in the literature
The empirical literature on firm exits, though elaborate, is deficient in several aspects.
Firstly, little is known about the impact of the macroeconomy on business failure at the
firm level, and even less is known about the similarities and differences between these effects
for various forms of exit (Caves, 1998; Bhattacharjee et al., 2002), except in the case of
UK quoted firms (Bhattacharjee et al., 2002). The empirical evidence on the importance
of macroeconomic stability in the UK underscore the importance of smooth macroeconomic
management for the corporate sector, and similar evidence for other economies requires to
be explored.
Second, the micro-based theories of mergers cannot explain, by themselves, why the merger
process should be episodic. Antoniou et al. (1998, p.2) admit that “[p]articularly puzzling
is the observation that even without obvious changes to its market or financial posture, a
firm could become a target for acquisition at one particular point in its life, but not at
others.”Generally, a characteristic of all these micro-studies has been the lack of strong
statistical results and explanatory power in discriminating between competing theories, or
the financial characteristics of companies involved in takeovers. Weston et al. (1990, p.276)
also note: “[a] complete theory of mergers should have implications on the timing of merger
activity. As the matter stands, there does not exist an accepted theory which simultaneously
explains motivations behind mergers, characteristics of acquiring and acquired firms, and the
23Including, among others, industrial activity, growth rate of real GNP, Tobins’ q, interest rates, the
general business cycle, tax rates, capacity utilisation rates, the market premium, and the cost of debt.
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determinants of the levels of aggregate merger activity.”
Further, there have been no studies aiming to understand the importance of legal procedures
related to bankruptcy on business failure across different economies, though there are ap-
preciable differences between economies in the kind of bankruptcy procedures, and a debate
exists about the appropriateness of legal systems for the financial health of firms. These are
some of the issues that this paper aims to shed light on.
Appendix 2: Derivation of the model
The ith firm’s state of technology (or efficiency) at time t is indicated by zit and its capital
by Kit. Firms operate under a production function which takes the form f(z)K. Here f(z)
is akin to the output-capital ratio and depends on firm efficiency: ∂f(z)/∂z > 0. Following
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001, 2002), we assume that firm specific technology z follows a
first-order Markov process and is positively autorrelated. We also assume that the time
evolution of the the economy wide macro-environment variable u is Markov and has positive
autorrelation, and that z and u are independent of each other. It follows that z and u jointly
have Markov transition:
Pr[zit+1 ≤ z
′, ut+1 ≤ u
′|zit = z, ut = u] = F (z
′, u′|z, u).
The assumption is reasonable in a world where each firm comes under the influence of the
same macroeconomic environment irrespective of their z, and where the the draw of z in
any period depends only on the level of technology in the previous period and is, therefore,
independent of u. The Markov transition in u and the positive autocorrelation of z and u
are also reasonable in this setup.
There is a market for K, but there is no market for z or for u. Investment in new capital
is denoted X and investment in acquired capital is denoted by Y . K evolves as K ′ =
(1− δ)K+X+Y , where δ is the depreciation rate. Internal costs of adjustment C(K,X, Y )
are homogeneous of degree 1 in K,X, Y , C(K,X, Y ) = KC(1, X/K, Y/K) = Kc(x, y),
where x = X/K and y = Y/K. We assume that c(0, 0) = 0, increasing and convex in (x, y),
and differentiable.
It is now possible to determine the value of the firm with K units of capital following Hayashi
and Inoue (1991). Normalise the price of new capital to unity, so that the price of acquired
capital q < 1. Macroeconomic instability enters the profit function by decreasing profits in
firm specific ways. For example, in the case of production-to-stock industries instability in
demand will lead to higher costs through the build up of inventories.
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Profits can then be written as [f(z)− C(x, y)− x− g(u)]K, where g(u) is the firm specific
impact of instability on profits, with g(0) = 0, increasing and convex in u. The market value
per unit of capital is then:
Q(z, u) = maxx≥0,y≥0{f(z)− C(x, y)− x− qy − g(u) + (1− δ + x+ y)Q
′(z, u)},
where
Q′(z, u) =
1
1 + r
∫ ∫
max{q,Q(z′, u′)dF (z′, u′|z, u)}
is the discounted expected present value of capital in the next period given the firm’s z and
the economy’s u today. The firm has an option of selling its capital in the next period on the
acquisition market at a price of q per unit of capital. Following Hayashi and Inoue (1991),
Q(z, u) = Q (f(z)− g(u)). Since z and u are jointly Markov, f(z)−g(u) is Markov. Further,
since z and u are both positively autocorrelated, f(z)−g(u) is also positively autocorrelated.
Hence, Q(z, u) increases in z and decreases in u.
At an interior maximum, the optimal x and y satisfy the first order conditions c1(x, y) =
Q′(z, u) − 1 and c2(x, y) = Q
′(z, u) − q. Assume that there is a fixed cost ϕ of acquiring
the capital of other firms. Let i = x+ y be the gross investment rate in efficiency units. A
low-i firm will avoid the cost ϕ by setting y = 0 and using only x, whereas a high-i firm
will use both margins. The value, i∗, at which the firm is indifferent between buying in the
acquisitions market and staying out, solves for i in the equation:
i+ c(i, 0) = ϕ+miny{(i− y) + qy + c(i− y, y)}.
The LHS is lower when i is small, and the RHS is lower when i is high, where i itself
depends on z and u. A firm may exit, either by liquidation and selling off its capital, or
by getting acquired. In either case, it gets q per unit of capital. The point of indifference
between exiting and staying in business is given by the level ze that solves Q(z, u) = q. Since
∂Q(z, u)/∂u < 0, ∂ze/∂u > 0. Given u, let z
∗(u) be such that i(z∗, u) + c(i(z∗, u), 0) = ϕ+
miny{(i(z
∗, u)−y)+qy+c(i(z∗, u)−y, y)} and i∗ = i(z∗, u). Since, given z, ∂i(z, u)/∂u < 0,
∂i(z, u)/∂u > 0.
In a steady state in which the distribution of z repeats itself period after period (Hopenhayn,
1992), the fate of the incumbents can be represented by the four regions of z (Jovanovic
and Rousseau, 2002). Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001, 2002) provide empirical evidence for
y becoming positive beyond z∗ (the value of z that corresponds to i∗ , given u), and y
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overtaking x beyond z0
24. This is the case if there were no u, unlike our case where the
macroeconomy (u) has a role to play.
The implications of changes in u on firm exits and acquisitions can now be understood with
reference to Jovanovic and Rousseau’s (2002) plot on the four regions of z. Let u > u. Then,
ze (u) > ze(u) and z
∗ (u) > z∗(u) (Figure 2).
Evidently, in a period with higher u, more firms make the decision to exit, and less firms
make the decision to acquire. Hence, more firms would go bankrupt during these periods
if there is no mechanism like Chapter 11 whereby firms can take legal shelter from their
creditors for a period of time, until a period when u falls back again.
Appendix 3: The institutional framework
Chapter 11 was introduced in the US by the 1978 bankruptcy code. Its aim is the survival
of the firm as a going concern even if this reduces the proceeds available to creditors (Skeel,
2001). To facilitate this, existing management (‘the debtor’) continue to manage the firm
and have significant rights as debtor-in-possession. Filing under Chapter 11 stays almost
all claims, and while interest accrues on fully secured debt it does not accrue on unsecured
or partly secured debt. The court mandates the management to propose a reorganisation
plan. They initially have 120 days to do this, though the period may then be extended
repeatedly by the court. Creditors can resist a Chapter 11 filing by themselves petitioning
for an immediate winding-up. Gilson (1991) shows that while Chapter 11 had almost always
been preceded by an attempt at informal workout or reorganisation, there may have been a
radical shift in the 1990s, with many firms opting to go directly to Chapter 11 and others
spending much less time in workout before going to Chapter 11. He attributes this to the
1986 Tax Reform Act which increased the relative attractiveness of Chapter 11 as compared
to an informal workout.
In the UK, the receivership system offers the main alternative to immediate liquidation of
a distressed firm. The UK 1986 Insolvency Act introduced the ‘administration’ process to
offer some of the characteristics of Chapter 11. Either the firm or a creditor may apply for
the appointment of an administrator who represents all creditors and has strong powers to
delay creditors claims — interest payments on loans are frozen, and lessors may be prevented
24Their evidence suggests that i0 has fallen over the past two decades from 1.43 in 1980, to 1.09 in 1989,
and to just 0.5 in 1998. This suggests that ϕ must also be falling. Their plot of used and acquired capital
as percentages of total investment also reflect the complementary nature of the two series.
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from repossessing assets deemed necessary for the running of the business. However, secured
creditors can block the appointment of an administrator by appointing a receiver and this is
likely to happen when secured and unsecured creditors have conflicting interests. In conse-
quence, administration has been used relatively little. Franks and Torous (1991) suggest that
receivers are conscious of their reputation with the small group of major lending institutions
that appoint most receivers, and that there is less risk to receivers in a rapid sale of assets.
In 1990, around three-quarters of UK formal reorganisations were liquidations while 22 per
cent used receivership (Rajak, 1994).
Thus, Chapter 11 and UK receivership are substantially different in their effects. Chapter 11
encourages the management to take out further borrowing with priority over many existing
claims. Though a UK receiver can borrow, any borrowing would be junior to existing claims,
with the result that receivers rarely take out further loans. While, in receivership interest on
loans continues to accrue, interest no longer accrues (other than on secured loans) from the
moment a firm enters Chapter 11. Also the receiver’s scope for action is severely limited by
secured creditors who can withdraw the assets over which they have security even though
these assets may be vital for continuing the business, whereas in Chapter 11 there is an
immediate stay on creditors exercising their claims. Hence, while the US code has usually
been seen as debtor-oriented, the UK code is seen as being creditor-oriented and potentially
leads to premature liquidation of UK firms.
The Chapter 11 process can take some years. Research suggests that smaller firms typically
spend less than a year in Chapter 11 (LoPucki, 1983; Kerkman, 1987), but that in larger
bankruptcies the period is typically two or three years. In Flynn (1989), two-thirds of the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases are concluded in the second or third year after filing. In
LoPucki and Whitford (1993a,b), who study bankruptcies greater than $100 million in size,
firms spend two or three years in Chapter 11. White (1994) reviews four studies which
examine samples of between 30 and 50 large US firms that had publicly traded equity and
that filed for bankruptcy during the 1980s. Almost all of the firms studied filed under
Chapter 11. It is very rare for large listed US firms to file under Chapter 7.25 However, after
a Chapter 11 filing, the court makes a decision whether the continuation value of the firm is
high enough to justify a reorganisation. If such reorganisation is not justifiable, the firm goes
into Chapter 7. In Eberhart et al. (1990) firms spend on average 2.1 years in reorganisation,
with a range of 10 months to over six years. In Franks and Torous (1991) firms spent an
average of 3.7 years in reorganisation. White (1994) also cites a study by Hotchkiss (1993)
who studies a complete sample of 809 listed firms filing for Chapter 11 between 1979 and
25Chapter 7 is the bankruptcy procedure, which inevitably leads to the winding up of the firm and the
sale of its assets. It is equivalent to the UK liquidation procedure.
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1988. In this sample the average time in reorganisation was 1.6 years. 197 of Hotchkiss’
sample of 809 firms emerged from Chapter 11 as listed firms. She found that one third of
these subsequently either restructured, filed for bankruptcy again, or were liquidated within
a few years. Based on data on 290 closely held firms that completed voluntary Chapter 11
filings at the Northeast Division of the Atlanta Bankruptcy Court between December 31,
1993 and December 31, 1994, Evans (2003) estimate that fewer firms were reorganized in
Chapter 11 (41 per cent) than were liquidated in Chapter 7 (59 per cent). Of the 118 firms
that reorganized in Chapter 11, 79 restructured their debt and 39 were acquired as part of
the plan of reorganization. Of the 172 cases converted to Chapter 7, 4 were because of failed
acquisition.
Existing management are normally given the exclusive right to make reorganisation propos-
als under Chapter 11. Whereas Flynn (1989) found that only 17 per cent of Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases resulted in an agreed plan, LoPucki (1983) found that of 57 Chapter 11
filings that he studied during the period 1979 to 1980, one third of the firms were still trading
two-to-three years after bankruptcy. The natural bidders in an auction will be firms in the
same industry, but to the extent that financial distress is sector-wide in its causes, the supply
of such bidders will be further limited just when they are needed (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).
LoPucki and Whitford (1993a,b) examine the 43 largest Chapter 11 bankruptcies between
1979 and 1998. They show that all asset sales were to existing firms which were usually from
the same sector and that no new firms were formed.
Thus, in summary, the way in which a reorganisation system like Chapter 11 works, it can act
as a safe haven for distressed firms during adverse macroeconomic conditions, enabling some
of them to recover and perhaps be acquired, thus attenuating the impact of macroeconomic
instability on bankruptcy hazard. Such a possibility is largely absent in the UK bankruptcy
code.
Appendix 4: Econometric Methodology
We model the competing risks due to bankruptcy and acquisitions using hazard regression
models. Two separate Cox proportional hazards models (Cox, 1972) are estimated for the
competing risks, where exits due to the other risk are considered as censored observations.
Credible inference in this setup requires making the cause-specific hazard function of interest
independent of the censoring, conditional on an adequate selection of covariates. If then, the
conditional censoring becomes noninformative about the conditional cause-specific hazard
of interest (in an appropriate sense, see Andersen et. al., 1992, pp.150-151; Arjas and
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Haara, 1984), efficient inference can be made.26 In the model for bankruptcy, we include all
covariates that affect the hazard of exits due to acquisition, and vice versa, and conditional
on the covariates the exits due to either of the two competing causes are assumed to be
independent of censoring due to the other. The explicit estimation of separate models for
the two major competing causes of exit allows us to take care of dependence between these
two different modes of exit.
In addition to right-censoring (by dependant competing risks), the models presented in this
paper are based on duration data truncated to the left; in that they pertain only to the period
since 1965 (for the UK firms) and 1969 (for the US firms). For the US, for example, the
left-truncation duration is given by L = max (L∗∗, 1969−B), where B is the listing-year of
the firm, and L∗∗ represents any delay in entry into the panel subsequent to listing. The Cox
partial likelihood estimates based on a modified definition of risk sets (delayed entry) would
be valid even if truncation and exit durations are independent conditional on covariates. We
evaluate the robustness of results to dependent truncation by estimating the exit duration
models conditioned on different ranges of the truncation duration and comparing estimates
for similarity.27
Further, the Cox PH model substantially restricts interdependence between the explanatory
variables and duration - the coefficients of the hazard function regressors are restricted to be
constant over time. This may not hold in many situations, or may even be unreasonable from
the point of view of relevant economic theory (McCall, 1994). In particular, the effect of a
covariate on the hazard is often observed to be increasing or decreasing in age (sometimes
over the whole covariate space, and sometimes over a range of the covariate space). This
clearly constitutes a violation of the proportionality assumption.28
An appealing solution to such violation of proportionality is to allow the covariate to have
different effects on the hazard according to age of the firm. Several estimators have been
proposed in the literature (see, for example, Zucker and Karr, 1990; Murphy and Sen, 1991;
Martinussen et al., 2002) that allow for such time-varying coefficients in the Cox regression
26In particular, if the censoring depends on time-invariant covariates which are not included in the model
for the cause-specific hazard under study, then the inference is efficient. If, however, the same covariates
are included in the cause-specific hazard and censoring mechanisms, inference is possible (after specifically
taking care to include these covariates also in the hazard model) since then one can assume that the censoring
is independent of the cause-specific hazard, conditional on the covariates.
27See Bhattacharjee et al. (2002) for further details of the econometrics and evaluation of robustness of
the empirical results.
28Some applications where such violations of the PH model is evident and tests of the PH model against
such alternatives is presented in Bhattacharjee and Das (2002).
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model. In this paper, we have used the appealing histogram-sieve estimators of Murphy
and Sen (1991), based on the method of sieves (Grenander, 1981), which we find intuitively
appealing and amenable to useful inference. This method entails dividing the duration
axis into several intervals and including the continuous covariate multiplied by an indicator
function that reflects each of the intervals as covariates in a modified Cox PH model.
In the analysis in this paper, the lives of firms, post-listing, was divided into four intervals
(0-8 years, 9-16 years, 17-25 years, and greater than 25 years). Our results demonstrate how
this helps us to effectively characterise the way the impact of a covariate varies over the life
of the firm. In particular, we find the expected result that the adverse effect of instability
declines in the age of the firm, post-listing. Bhattacharjee (2003) considers estimation of
hazard regression models where such ordered covariate dependence is known a priori. The
estimates of the impact of instability under such an order restriction provides useful inference.
The estimates of covariate effects reported in Table 1 are the maximum partial likelihood
estimates (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980). The reported z-scores are based on robust stan-
dard error estimates proposed by Lin and Wei (1989) for regression coefficients in the Cox
proportional hazards model. The fit of the models is judged using the goodness-of-fit test
by Grambsch and Therneau (1994) based on adjusted Schoenfeld residuals; these statistics
suggest that the estimated models are satisfactory descriptions of the duration data.
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TABLE 1: Model Estimates, UK and US
Variables UK, Bank. UK, Acq. US, Bank. US, Acq.
Industry Dummies
(not reported)
Firm × Year Level
Size: log(real fixed
capital +1) = s 1.487 (1.6) 1.412 (5.3)∗∗
— s× I1 0.571 (-1.4) 2.539 (5.1)
∗∗
— s× I2 0.078 (-6.6)
∗∗ 1.120 (0.8)
— s× I3 0.067 (-5.4)
∗∗ 1.149 (0.8)
— s× I4 0.132 (-6.0)
∗∗ 0.931 (-0.7)
Size-squared = s2 0.942 (-2.2)∗ 0.961 (-6.2)∗∗
— s2 × I1 1.058 (0.3) 0.725 (-3.5)
∗∗
— s2 × I2 1.549 (5.8)
∗∗ 0.917 (-1.6)
— s2 × I3 1.463 (3.1)
∗∗ 0.889 (-1.9)+
— s2 × I4 1.297 (3.6)
∗∗ 0.950 (-2.0)∗
Cash flow to Capital = c 1.000 (1.6) 1.001 (2.4)∗
— c× I1 0.908 (-3.3)
∗∗ 4.179 (4.4)∗∗
— c× I2 0.682 (-4.0)
∗∗ 1.302 (2.5)∗
— c× I3 0.113 (-1.6) 0.351 (-2.8)
∗∗
— c× I4 0.381 (-3.3)
∗∗ 0.661 (-2.0)∗
Retn. on capital employed 0.997 (-2.2)∗ 1.001 (0.9) 1.000 (-4.2)∗∗ 0.999 (-2.3)∗
Macroeconomic
Conditions
Output gap = o
— o× I1 34901 (1.4) 75131 (4.2)
∗∗ 0.409 (-0.2) 29.60 (1.4)
— o× I2 0.002 (-0.7) 1734 (3.2)
∗∗ 0.001 (-2.0)∗ 2.231 (0.4)
— o× I3 2.9e-5 (-1.1) 0.043 (-1.0) 0.000 (-1.5) 1920 (2.5)
∗
— o× I4 4716 (1.2) 28.53 (1.2) 0.002 (-0.8) 336.9 (1.9)
+
Entries (y-o-y growth rates) 1.014 (1.7)+ 0.997 (-1.7)+ 0.979 (-0.3) 1.043 (1.7)+
Long-term real int. rate = r
— r × I1 1.163 (1.4) 1.121 (3.6)
∗∗ 1.469 (9.0)∗∗ 1.345 (14.1)∗∗
— r × I2 1.018 (0.4) 0.945 (-4.0)
∗∗ 1.142 (4.2)∗∗ 1.246 (12.4)∗∗
— r × I3 0.962 (-0.9) 0.994 (-0.3) 1.130 (2.4)
∗ 1.133 (4.5)∗∗
— r × I4 1.072 (0.9) 0.973 (-1.4) 1.189 (2.4)
∗ 1.167 (5.7)∗∗
Exchange rate = e 0.080 (-1.9)+ 7.048 (5.2)∗∗
— e× I1 0.954 (-7.1)
∗∗ 0.963 (-12.6)∗∗
— e× I2 0.973 (-7.6)
∗∗ 0.977 (-10.6)∗∗
— e× I3 0.985 (-3.1)
∗∗ 1.001 (0.7)
— e× I4 1.007 (1.2) 1.011 (5.7)
∗∗
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TABLE 1: Contd.
Variables UK, Bank. UK, Acq. US, Bank. US, Acq.
Macroeconomic
Instability
Turnaround = trn 1.718 (0.4) 0.923 (-0.2)
— trn× I1 9.3e-11 (-3.0)
∗∗ 0.017 (-1.7)+
— trn× I2 0.152 (-0.3) 300.3 (2.6)
∗∗
— trn× I3 0.001 (-1.0) 19.79 (1.4)
— trn× I4 0.000 (-1.0) 1.834 (0.2)
y-o-y increase in
exchange rate = v 1.002 (0.1) 0.963 (-3.9)∗∗
— v × I1 9.6e+5 (3.5)
∗∗ 0.424 (-0.7)
— v × I2 289.456 (1.4) 0.322 (-1.1)
— v × I3 17.577 (0.5) 0.072 (-1.8)
+
— v × I4 1305 (1.7)
+ 1.037 (0.0)
Volatility - prices 1.276 (5.8)∗∗ 0.904 (-5.9)∗∗ 0.686 (-1.3) 1.355 (2.4)∗
Volatility - Long term
int. rate = l 0.987 (-0.2) 1.033 (1.7)+
— l × I1 1.065 (1.7)
+ 1.018 (1.0)
— l × I2 0.968 (-0.9) 1.007 (0.4)
— l × I3 0.947 (-1.4) 1.051 (2.6)
∗∗
— l × I4 0.901 (-1.8)
+ 1.037 (1.8)+
Volatility - Short term
int. rate 0.949 (-1.4) 0.991 (-0.8) 1.005 (0.9) 1.009 (3.7)∗∗
No. of firms 4,320 4,320 13,655 13,655
No. of exits 166 1,859 561 2,516
Total time at risk
(in years) 45,527 45,527 132,410 132,410
Log-likelihood -1090.59 -12947.1 -4210.73 -19075.2
Chi-square test
stat.(PH assmp.) 29.99 14.36 16.52 28.19
degrees of freedom 38 38 39 39
p-value 82.0 100.0 99.9 90.0
z-scores in parentheses.
Parameters reported are hazard ratios (exponential of the actual parameter values).
For the UK, I1, I2, I3 and I4 represent the indicator functions I(age 0-5 yrs.), I(age 6-15 yrs.), I(age 16-25 yrs) and I(age > 25 yrs) respectively.
For the US, the same represent I(age 0-8 yrs.), I(age 9-16 yrs.), I(age 17-25 yrs) and I(age > 25 yrs) respectively.
Volatility is measured as maximum monthly difference during the year, divided by the no. of intervening mths.
∗∗, ∗ and + — Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Fig. 1.– A model of firm bankruptcies and acquisitions.
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Fig. 2.– Impact of Macroeconomic Instability on Business Exits.
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Fig. 3.– Model Fit: Business cycle and Bankruptcies, UK.
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Fig. 4.– Model Fit: Business cycle and Acquisitions, UK.
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Fig. 5.– Model Fit: Business cycle and Bankruptcies, US.
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Fig. 6.– Model Fit: Business cycle and Acquisitions, US.
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Fig. 7.– UK: Effect of Macroeconomic Instability on Firm Exits (Hazard Ratios).
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Fig. 8.– Effect of Exch. Rate and Int. rate instability on Business Exit — Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11.
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Fig. 9.– Predicted Incidence rates — Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
